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ABSTRACT
Although theories in both evolutionary biology and economics predict that an individual’s health
should be associated with the individual’s time preference, no prior study has been done to
empirically support or refute such predictions. By collecting detailed measures of health, time
preference, and expected longevity on a sample of individuals in townships around Durban,
South Africa, this study breaks new ground by being the first to analyze in detail the relationship
between time preference and health, in an area of the world with high mortality and morbidity.
Interestingly, we find that both physical health and expectations of longevity have a U-shaped
relationship with the person’s subjective discount rate. This suggests that those in very poor
health have high discount rates, but those in very good health also have high discount rates.
Similarly those with longevity expectations on the extremes have high discount rates. The
research question addressed by this pilot project is policy relevant, as the study tries to determine
the importance of health in economic development, not from the commonly asserted
productivity-gain argument, but from a much broader investment-for-the-future argument.
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INTRODUCTION
The utility from consumption in the future is, ceteris paribus, often “discounted” relative
to the utility from consuming the same commodity bundle in the current period. “Time
preference” is the term used to describe the phenomenon that people attach different values to
the same consumption bundle depending on when consumption of that commodity bundle
occurs. In this paper, we are concerned with the degree to which an individual discounts future
consumption relative to current consumption, which we call the subjective discount rate or level
of impatience. Where patience is the willingness to wait for something in the future, which
corresponds to forgoing current consumption and its associated utility in exchange for future
consumption and utility, impatience is the unwillingness to wait.
Although time preference is commonly assumed in models of intertemporal choice, the
literature does not fully explain why some people are more impatient than others. For example,
some individuals manage to save money for retirement, whereas others with otherwise similar
personal characteristics (like income, education, race, age, and sex) do not manage to save.
Understanding the determinants of a person’s subjective discount rate is important because
policies could be better tuned to induce more desirable results if they included an accurate
estimate of people’s intertemporal optimization decisions, while, at the same time, decision tools
and policy manipulable variables could be developed to shape people’s intrinsic subjective
discount rates. In other words, policy analysts should be concerned about impatience because
individuals underinvest in the future in many domains, including retirement savings and health.
Furthermore, individuals could be encouraged to counter this underinvestment behavior if precommitment devices were more readily available. An example is a pre-commitment to save, such
as a retirement plan with savings rates tied to future salary increases (Thaler and Bernartzi, 2004)
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or a fixed deposit account with large penalties for early withdrawal (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin,
2006), or even a pre-commitment to fertility control such as an implantable contraceptive device
that lasts two or more years instead of the condom that often requires last minute decisionmaking. The intrinsic interest in policies or strategies that entail pre-commitment arises in
situations where an individual would rather invest for the future but finds it difficult to resist the
temptations of consuming in the present period.
Recent advances in evolutionary biology, economics, psychology, and neuroscience have
provided some clues as to the potential determinants of subjective discount rates (for a succinct
review, see Read & Read 2004). Evolutionary biology assumes that subjective discount rates are
exogenously dictated by one’s genes and models a person’s subjective discount rate as a product
of natural selection to maximally propagate one’s genes (e.g., Rogers 1994; Sozou & Seymour
2003). These models predict a subjective discount rate that peaks at a time in life (as proxied by
age) when reproductive potential is high, so that resources can be expended on sexual
reproduction to propagate genes, rather than saved.
In contrast to the evolutionary biology approach, the field of economics models time
preference from a utility maximization framework and derives subjective discount rates as
outcomes of endogenous choice. Becker & Mulligan (1997) assume that each person is endowed
with an initial level of subjective discount rate, but that rate can be modified by the individual
investing time and resources to produce “future-oriented capital” to make the future more salient,
allowing one to appreciate the future more and to place more weight on future utility of
consumption -- leading to a lower subjective discount rate. Their model implies that an
exogenous increase in longevity will correspondingly give consumers incentives to invest in
“future-oriented capital” so that the extra life years gained can be better appreciated – resulting
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in a lower subjective discount rate. In addition to longevity, subjective discount rate may also be
related to health. Trostel & Taylor (2001) show that the increasing rate of decline in one’s ability
to enjoy visceral pleasures, such as with natural ageing and declines in health over the lifecycle,
is associated with increasing decline of marginal utility of consumption over time, resulting in an
inverse relationship between subjective discount rate and age (as a proxy for health). Recently,
neuroimaging data provide a physiological explanation of impatience. Data derived from
participants’ choices between smaller sooner monetary rewards versus larger later monetary
rewards show that separate processes (limbic areas versus the lateral prefrontal areas,
respectively) regulate decisions regarding immediate rewards versus delayed rewards (McClure
et al. 2004) and that a quasi-hyperbolic discount function (e.g., Laibson 1997) approximates
neuroimaging and survey data better than alternative functional forms. Nevertheless, it is unclear
at this time what factors (such as ageing, illness, or experience), if any, might alter the activities
of these brain regions in making temporal decisions.
We build our hypotheses based on the above theories and relate them to existing
empirical findings. First, we expect the discount rate to be U-shaped when plotted against age,
based on the theory developed in evolutionary biology and described above. Read & Read
(2004) found evidence of a mostly U-shaped function using a survey of young, middle, and older
aged adults in the United Kingdom.
H1: The discount rate is high for young adults, low for middle-aged individuals, and
high for older individuals.
Second, the subjective discount rate may vary with health. We can expect this to be the
case for a few reasons. Those in poor health may have a high subjective discount rate because
they do not expect to live as long. Besides longevity reasons, those in poor health may expend
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more resources to improve health (or prevent further health decline) than to build “future
oriented capital” as in Becker & Mulligan (1997), resulting in a higher subjective discount rate.
Although poor health may be associated with a high subjective discount rate, the theory by
Trostel and Taylor (2004) suggests that those in very good health may also have a high
subjective discount rate because they derive greater utility from consumption when healthy than
when sick. A few studies have also empirically examined the relationship between one’s health
and one’s subjective discount rate, but these studies used somewhat limited measures for health
and found mixed results. Kirby et al. (2002) used body mass index (BMI) and found no
relationship; Read & Read (2004) used two dichotomous variables for health (good vs. bad
health; existence of disease in last year vs. no existence of disease in last year) and found poor
health to be unrelated to the subjective discount rate for money but related to the subjective
discount rate for vacation; and Tu et al. (2004) found BMI and general health to be positively
associated with the subjective discount rate for money, linking obesity with impatience but also
good health with impatience. Based on these theories and empirical studies, we expect the
discount rate to be U-shaped when plotted against health.
H2: Those in very poor or very good health have a high subjective discount rate,
and those with average health have a lower discount rate.
Third, we expect the subjective discount rate to be inversely correlated with expected
longevity. Individuals that do not expect to live long will expend their resources in the current
period. Bloom et al. (2003), in a cross country panel study of national savings rates, found
evidence of a relationship between increased longevity and increased savings behavior. Picone et
al. (2004), using the U.S. Health and Retirement Study population, found that increased
longevity is associated with investments in health. Thornton (2007) found that people in Malawi

6

who learned they were HIV negative and were optimistic about their future infection risks had
higher subjective life expectancies and were more likely to invest in agricultural inputs than
those who tested positive or were pessimistic about their future risks.
H3: The subjective discount rate will be inversely correlated with expected
longevity.
In this paper, we try to add some insight into the determinants of subjective discount rates
by testing the above hypotheses. We continue by discussing the survey data that we collected,
and then we describe our results. Next, we explore potential explanations for our results, list the
weaknesses and strengths of our study, and conclude with policy implications.
METHOD
Participants and Procedures
This study is part of a larger study on the impact of poor health and HIV/AIDS on micro and
small enterprises (MSEs) around Durban, South Africa. The sample is described in detail in
Chao et. al. (2007). Surveys were conducted over a three year period in select townships around
Durban, South Africa, with information on health, business activity, and general demographics.
Time preference measures were collected during the third year of the survey, and this paper is
based on the results from the total of 175 individuals that had complete responses to questions on
time preference, health, and other related variables collected during the third-year survey.
Measures
Five parts of the questionnaire were used to measure the respondent’s subjective discount rate,
physical and mental health, subjective probabilities of one-, five-, and ten-year survival, planning
and savings behavior, expectations of future economic condition and income.
Subjective discount rate. The first set of questions adopts the time preference instrument
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originally developed by Kirby and Marakovic (1996) and also used in Kirby et al. (1999). The
questionnaire presents participants with a set of 27 hypothetical choices between smaller sooner
rewards and larger later rewards. An example of one of the choices in this instrument is “Would
you prefer $34 today to $50 in 30 days?” From these choices, an overall subjective discount rate
can be calculated. The respondents in Kirby et al. (1999) had a one in six chance of actually
receiving real payoffs. In our experiment, all responses were hypothetical, and we used the South
African Rand (which had an exchange rate at the time of survey of about 6.7 rand to the dollar).
It is not obvious whether having a real payoff from the time preference questions would have
resulted in better measures of impatience. The literature provides conflicting evidence as to
whether answers to hypothetical time preference questions differed from those with real payoffs.
Coller and Williams (1999), using a between subject design, found the discount rates from
hypothetical questions to be larger than those from questions with real payoffs; however,
Johnson and Bickel (2002), using a within subject design, found no statistical difference in
discount rates derived from real and hypothetical questions.
In this study, we decided not to use real payoffs for two pressing issues. First, we were
unable to make a 100% guarantee of delivery of the future reward to our participants (due to
respondent trust, relocation, and other logistical issues). Without 100% certainty that a chosen
future reward would be delivered, the measured discount rates would reflect not only impatience,
but also the risk premium that the participants attach to the uncertainty of receiving the chosen
future reward. Although the direction of such a bias would likely be choice for the immediate
reward (i.e., a higher measured discount rate), the magnitude of such a bias would be unobserved
and would likely differ by participants. Eliciting time preference using real money, thus, would
more likely result in this kind of bias that could not be controlled for by our statistical procedures
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in the analysis. We have shown elsewhere that health is related to trusting behavior (Chao &
Kohler 2007). Because health is a key explanatory variable in our regressions, we did not want to
create an omitted variable bias (i.e., “trust in the interviewer’s ability to deliver a future reward”)
that was correlated with both health and discount rates.
The second reason that we did not give real monetary rewards was that we did not want
the participants to “think too much” about the monetary tradeoffs. Real monetary rewards have
been purported to create incentives for participants to exert cognitive effort in answering survey
questions (Camerer & Hogarth 1999; Read 2005), but time preference questions of the type
asked in our survey have also been scrutinized and criticized for measuring outside lending and
borrowing opportunities rather than impatience in consumption (Coller & Williams 1999; Cubitt
& Read 2007). Because the goal of our study was to find determinants of impatience rather than
outside financial opportunities, we used monetary tradeoffs that were hypothetical, so as to
minimize the incentive for the participants to answer after careful calculations. In fact, our
interviewers were trained to instruct the respondents to answer these monetary tradeoff questions
quickly and based on “gut feeling” rather than careful introspective mathematical calculation.
Health Measures. We used the SF12 health status instrument, which consists of 12 questions
that assess symptoms, functioning, and quality of life among two dimensions: mental and
physical health. Examples of questions included in the SF12 are “Do you have any health
problems that limit you in carrying out moderate activities? (For example walking to transport or
helping at home. If so, how much?)” and “How much of the time during the past 4 weeks did
you have a lot of energy?” Also, one of the 12 questions is a self-assessed general health
question in which the respondent is asked to rate his/her health into five categories, ranging from
excellent to poor. Separate scores for physical health (PCS12) and for mental health (MCS12)
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are obtained by weighting each question according to a formula (Ware et al. 1995). This
instrument was designed to be easily administered and answered even by individuals that cannot
read and has been validated in many developing countries in various languages.
Subjective Probabilities of Survival. The next set of questions asked individuals about their
subjective probabilities of survival from 0% to 100% to measure how certain the respondent is
that he/she will not die in the next 1, 5, or 10 years. (Although, we are not technically calculating
longevity, in the text we sometimes refer to longevity, so the reader should be aware that we are
calculating subjective survival probabilities.) A similar question is asked in the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) in the U.S. Smith et al. (2001) `demonstrate that respondents not only
can answer these questions, but that their answers indeed predict how long they will live.
Planning and Savings Behavior. We asked two questions about the respondents’ planning
behavior and another two questions about the respondents’ savings behavior. For the planning
behavior, we asked whether the respondents classified themselves as planning ahead all the time
or living from day to day. Similarly, for savings behavior, we asked whether the respondents
classified themselves as preferring to spend money to enjoy life today or to save more for the
future. These questions were modeled after the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Expectations of Economic and Business Situation in the Next Two Years. Because current
versus future marginal utility of consumption depends on the income level in the two time
periods, we asked all respondents whether they expected the economic situation of their
community to improve a lot, improve a little, remain the same, decline a little, or decline a lot in
the next two years. Among the owners of small businesses, we also asked an additional question
on their expectations of income growth from their own business for the following two years.
Data Analysis
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To estimate a subjective discount rate for each individual, we assume a hyperbolic discount
function, where the present value V of a delayed reward is determined by

V =

A
,
1 + kD

where A is the reward, D is the delay, and k is the parameter that determines the subjective
discount rate (Mazur 1987; Kirby & Marakovic 1996). This function has been shown by many
authors to provide a good fit to time preference data elicited by similar methods (e.g., Kirby et.
al. 1999; Laibson 1997; McClure 2004). Unlike exponential discount functions (which assume a
constant per-period discount rate regardless of the time interval), hyperbolic discount functions
allow for a higher per-period discount rate for delays in the immediate future but lower perperiod discount rate for long delays – allowing for the function to better approximate time
preferences with an immediacy premium. Given the high mortality and morbidity rates and the
overall uncertainty in the environment of our sample population, our respondents may have a
preference for immediate reward above and beyond a constant level of impatience. The
hyperbolic discount function is not without controversy, however, as various recent experiments
using similar time preference elicitation methods suggest that a constant per-period discount
function like the exponential discount function cannot be rejected by the data, especially after a
fixed cost to any delay is allowed (Benhabib, Bisin, & Schotter 2006; Coller, Harrison, &
Rustrom 2003; Read, Airoldi, & Loewe 2005). Because two of the major papers most related to
ours used different functions to calculate the subjective discount rate (Read & Read 2004 used an
exponential function and Kirby et al. 2002 used a hyperbolic function), we also used the
exponential discount function in our analyses and found that the results and conclusions did not
differ by discount function.
Using the calculated subjective discount rate for each participant, we analyzed the
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bivariate relationships between the subjective discount rate and the respondents’ demographic
characteristics, as well as their age, health, and expectations of their own subjective survival
probability to live a certain number of years. We then performed multivariate regressions.
Because the subjective discount rates elicited by the hypothetical monetary tradeoffs are
constrained to be between 0.00016 and 0.25, we used two-sided tobit regressions to account for
the left- and right-side censoring of the calculated subjective discount rate.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics

We have 175 individuals in the sample, 73% are female, 46% are married or have a cohabiting
partner. The mean age of the sample is just above 46 years, ranging from 18 to 91. In terms of
education, 6% of respondents have no formal education, 20% have some primary, 13% have
finished primary school, 29% have some secondary, 21% have finished secondary school, 4%
have some tertiary school, and 7% have finished tertiary school. Of the 175 respondents in our
sample, 95 (55%) are either currently running a small business or ran a business that has recently
closed.
Health Status: The respondents’ mean physical and mental health scores for the SF12 are

42.4 and 51.8, respectively, with standard deviations of 12.1 and 10.9. The mean health score in
our population is lower than that in the United States (which has a normalized score of 50),
although the standard deviation is similar (at around 10) (Ware et al. 1995). Twenty-two percent
of respondents report their health to be excellent, 25% report their health to be very good, 28%
report their health to be good, 21% report their health to be fair, and 4% report their health to be
poor.
Subjective Probability of Survival: An analysis of the time horizon questions shows that
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there is some variance in individuals’ expectations regarding how long they will live. Although
38% say they are 100% confident that they will “live to this time next year,” 21% state at least a
60% chance of not living until the next year. The mean response is an 82% confidence to live to
the next year. When we asked individuals their expectations to living to this time in five years,
25% expressed a 100% confidence that they would live to this time in 5 years, and 31% of
respondents expressed a 50-50 chance of living to the next 5 years. The mean response was just
above a 70% chance of living to the next 5 years. A similar pattern is found when we consider
individuals’ expectations to live 10 years. While 19% of respondents are 100% confident that
they will be alive, 48% of respondents expressed a 50-50 percent chance or lower of being alive
in 10 years.
//Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample//
Means Subjective discount rates: Subjective discount rates as calculated by the Kirby-

Marakovic method were relatively high in our sample, at 0.078, which is substantially higher
than the subjective discount rates of both heroin addicts (0.025) and controls (0.013) studied by
Kirby et al. (1999) in the U.S., but lower than the median subjective discount rates (0.12) found
by Kirby et al. (2002) among the Tsimane’ Amerindians in Bolivia. We found a skewed
distribution of subjective discount rates. Although a large number of individuals exhibit
subjective discount rates that are within the ranges found in other studies such as Kirby et al.
(1999), there is also a large number of individuals displaying the highest subjective discount rate
(31 in 175), and a significant number of individuals displaying the lowest subjective discount
rate (7 in 175), which reflects the censoring of the subjective discount rates due to the nature of
the monetary-choice tradeoffs in our questionnaire. The high proportion of right-censored
observations confirms the hypothesis that individuals suffer from a bias towards immediate
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gratification in this subsample. Figures 1a and 1b show the frequency distributions of the
subjective discount rates and of the natural log of the subjective discount rates, with the lines
representing a kernel density estimation and the best-fitting normal distribution.
//Figure 1a and 1b; Frequency Diagram of dr and ln(dr)//
Subjective discount rate, Socioeconomics, Age, Health, Survival.

We also looked at the bivariate relationship between the subjective discount rate and the various
socioeconomic variables, age, health, and survival expectations, and these are presented in Table
2a. It is interesting to note that gender, marital status, business ownership, and income level of
the respondent’s area of residence were not statistically significantly related to subjective
discount rate.
//Table 2a: (need new revised table) Mean Subjective discount rate, by Sociodemographics//
We also examined the Spearman rank correlations between the individual subjective
discount rate and education, age, physical health, mental health, and subjective survival
probability. The results are shown in the bottom half of Table 2a. It is interesting to note that
none of these variables is rank-correlated with subjective discount rate. This could either be
because a relationship between these variables and the subjective discount rate does not exist, or
that the relationship is non-linear. Because the theoretical predictions (see Introduction above)
suggest that the relationship between age and subjective discount rate may be non-linear and
perhaps U-shaped, we also plotted the subjective discount rate against age, health, and subjective
survival probability. We do not find any relationship between subjective discount rate and age,
but the relationship between subjective discount rate and health and between subjective discount
rate and survival probability are both U-shaped.
//Figure 2a,b,c: Subjective discount rate vs. Age, PCS12, Survival//
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We also examined the relationship between subjective discount rates and several
behavioral variables that are often linked with time preference, such as willingness to plan for the
future and to save money. We found that respondents that claimed that they “planned their life
ahead all the time” had lower subjective discount rates than those that claimed to “live more
from day to day” (0.066 compared to 0.106, p=0.0085, one-tailed). Also, those that preferred to
“spend money and enjoy life now” had higher subjective discount rates than those that preferred
to “save more for the future” (0.110 compared to 0.067, p=0.01, one-tailed). Because planning
and savings require a preference for waiting for a larger reward in the future, these behaviors are
good tests for the construct validity of our discount rate measure. Indeed, the results in Table 2b
suggest that the level of patience as measured by our subjective discount rate is consistent with
the planning and savings behaviors in our sample.
//Table 2b: Spearman Correlation: Subjective discount rate, by Selected Behavioral Variables//
Two-Sided Tobit Regressions

We performed a series of regressions using both ordinary least squares and two-sided
tobit, with both subjective discount rate and the natural log of the subjective discount rate as the
dependent variable. The results were similar but not identical, and our main conclusions remain
the same with the various specifications. Given that the subjective discount rate is censored from
the left and the right and that the subjective discount rate is highly skewed without the log
transformation, we present below the results obtained from two-sided tobit regressions with
ln(subjective discount rate) as the dependent variable.
In order to test Hypothesis 1 that the subjective discount rate should be related to age, we
first regressed ln(subjective discount rate) on age and age square. The results are shown in
column one. It is noteworthy that although the subjective discount rate appeared to have a U-
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shape relationship with respect to age, the estimates were only marginally significant, while at
the same time, age and age-squared were not jointly significant. Gender and marital status were
insignificant. Those who had no education had a very significantly higher subjective discount
rate than those with at least some primary school education.
//Table 3: Two-Sided Tobit Regression of ln(subjective discount rate)//
We next examined Hypotheses 2 and 3 to test whether health and survival probability
were associated with subjective discount rates, and these results are presented in specifications
(2) through (5) in Table 3. Physical health, but not mental health, was highly significantly
associated with the subjective discount rate. The significance of the age variable disappeared
with the inclusion of the health variables; this suggests that rather than age, it may be the level of
physical health that explains the U-shaped pattern found in previous studies. Given that health
may be associated with the subjective discount rate through its effect on mortality risk, we next
added the one-year subjective probability of survival to the regression. (Because the questions to
elicit the subjective discount rates were all framed with a delay that is less than one year, we use
the 1-year survival probability in our analyses below; the results from using the 5- or 10-year
survival probability variable bear similar trends as the 1-year.) Interestingly, as shown in
specification (5) of Table 3, survival was not only highly significant, but inclusion of the survival
variables reduced both the magnitude and the significance level of the physical health variables –
suggesting that part of the effect of the health variable on subjective discount rate was via the
relationship between health and survival. In regressions not reported in Table 3, we also included
one-year survival without the health variables; the coefficient magnitude and significance level
of the survival variables were not reduced with the inclusion of the health variables. This
suggests that the effect of survival on discounting is not via health, but part of the effect of health
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on discounting is via survival.
From specification (5) in Table 3, it is apparent that the relationship between the
subjective discount rate and both health and survival was U-shaped, supporting hypothesis 2 but
in contrast to hypothesis 3. This suggests that those in very poor health have high subjective
discount rates, but those in very good health also have high subjective discount rates. Similarly
those with both high and low survival probabilities (but not those in between), display high
subjective discount rates. In fact, the nadir of the U-relationship between subjective discount rate
and health occured when PCS12 was 37.8, or slightly below the mean physical health level of the
sample. The nadir for the U-shaped relationship between the subjective discount rate and the
one-year survival probability occured at around 75%, or slightly below the mean subjective
survival probability for the sample.
Expanding income or consumption opportunity in the future may reduce the marginal
utility of consumption in the future (and hence lead to greater discounting of the future). To
control for the potential confounding effects that this might have on our results, we included a
variable on the respondent’s subjective outlook for the overall economic environment in their
community in the next two years. (Ten respondents did not answer this question and were
excluded from subsequent analysis.) Although this variable is not the same as the respondents’
subjective outlook for their own future consumption opportunity, to the extent that the subjective
outlook for own future consumption is correlated with that for their community, our variable
may still proxy for the effect of expanding or declining consumption or income possibilities on
the subjective discount rate. The results, shown in specification (6), show that those who thought
the economy was going to worsen a lot in the next two years (the omitted dummy) had the lowest
subjective discount rate. We also find that people with good future income prospects have a
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higher subjective discount rate, but also that the U-shaped relationship between the subjective
discount rate and health persists. Although the linear term is no longer significant at conventional
levels, the linear and quadratic terms combined are jointly significant in the model. Moreover,
because 6% of our sample did not respond to the question on prospects of future income, our
sample size was further reduced when we controlled for income expectations in the model.
Nevertheless, these results suggest that both health and longevity have a U-shaped relationship
with the subjective discount rate and that both are independent predictors of time preference.
DISCUSSION

Several of our main findings are surprising. Our first main finding is that age is not a
significant predictor of time preference, and is in contrast to the findings in Kirby et al. (2002)
and Read & Read (2004). In our sample, age was only significant in models where physical
health level was not included as a regressor. Our findings differ from those of these authors for at
least two reasons. One is that only 25% of our sample consists of people over the age of 55 and
that our sample may not contain enough older people to show an age effect, whereas Read &
Read (2004) concentrated their sample selection based on three age strata, with the oldest strata
around age 70. Notably, we are comparing different kinds of people in very different
environments. The other reason is that expected longevity, not age, may be a true underlying
determinant of people’s subjective discount rates. In populations where age does correlate well
with expected longevity, the effect of longevity on subjective discount rates can be wellmanifested by the effects from age. However, because causes of mortality in South Africa are not
necessarily related to age (e.g., mortality from HIV/AIDS affects more people less than age 40
than above), age is no longer a strong predictor of subjective discount rates.
Our second main finding is the U-shaped relationship between health and the subjective
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discount rate. This is a very interesting and important finding, and although we predicted this
relationship, no one else has either tested for it or found evidence for it. The few studies that did
examine the relationship between health and the subjective discount rate use of crude measures
of health. Furthermore, a non-linear relationship between health and the subjective discount rate
could have also contributed to the lack of any significant (linear) relationship assumed in these
other studies. We give more detail here to better explain the U-shaped relationship between the
subjective discount rate and health; however, we cannot yet determine which of the explanations
is driving the real relationship that we find, and it is even very likely that they coexist and that it
is exactly the interaction that determined the observed pattern. Our finding that those with
average health have lower discount rate than those who are very healthy or very sick could be
due to several reasons. First, according to Trostel & Taylor (2002) and Olsho (2006), the ability
to enjoy consumption depends on an individual’s health, and the healthier an individual, the
greater the enjoyment of the same commodity bundle. Because health generally declines over the
life cycle, individuals should have a high subjective discount rate when healthy and, thus, enjoy
the consumption while they still can. Second, people who are not very healthy are likely those
who were once very healthy but have now experienced some health decline; these people may
long for their better health in the past, which motivates them to start examining the past and the
future in general, so that the future becomes more salient (as in Liu & Aaker 2006 and Becker &
Mulligan 1997), resulting in a lower subjective discount rate for the future. The foregoing
explains why people of average health may have lower subjective discount rates than those with
very good health. We also find a higher subjective discount rate among people with very poor
health, and this finding is robust to having controlled for longevity (and hence wanting to spend
resources before death cannot explain this finding). People with very poor health may have more
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immediate need for cash to pay for medical care or for daily survival (perhaps because they are
too sick to work), hence the unwillingness to wait for the larger reward.
Our third main finding is the U-shaped relationship between the subjective discount rate
and survival probability after controlling for current physical and mental health status. It is
reasonable for people with low expected survival to have a high subjective discount rate, because
their future consumption may never come. This is what we expected to find (Hypothesis 3). It is
somewhat perplexing as to why those with a very high expected survival probability also highly
discount the future. We believe that saliency of time may explain this finding (as in the argument
for the saliency of health and its decline above). Liu & Aaker (2006) showed that personal
experience with someone who died of cancer is associated with decisions that favor long-term
future over the short-term present, and this effect seems to be related to the “salience and
concreteness regarding one’s future life course, shifting focus away from the present toward the
long run.” It is thus plausible that people who expect a very high probability of survival may not
have had cues from the environment to tell them otherwise; mortality to them is nonexistent.
However, as they experience deaths from social and family networks, death becomes more
salient. They not only start to revise downward their expected survival probability, but they also
start to think more about the future. As the future becomes more salient, they are more likely to
invest in “future oriented capital” and will discount the future less (as in Becker & Mulligan
1997).
LIMITATIONS & STRENGTHS

Our study provides seminal and thought provoking findings in terms of the relationship
between the individual subjective discount rate and age, health, survival, and future consumption
or income opportunities. While the study is subject to many limitations, our study also has
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strengths that overcome many other studies´ weaknesses. We first discuss the limitations,
followed by the strengths, and we end with some policy implications of our results.
The first limitation to our study is that we had a small sample that consisted of a majority
of business operators. While this gave us confidence that the answers to questions involving
monetary tradeoffs were less likely to be subject to the problems of low mathematical literacy, it
is unclear whether our results from a mostly mathematically-literate population are fully
generalizable to the general population in the developing world.
The second limitation is that we did not have good measures of household assets and
income; we only have measures of business profit and the income strata where the respondents
resided. Relative to the highest income area, the fixed effects for low and middle income areas
were consistently negative and some statistically significantly negative, which indicates that
respondents in the lower income areas have lower subjective discount rates than those from the
highest income area. This finding is opposite to that found by Read & Read (2004), who also
included income strata for their time preference study among populations of the United Kingdom
and found that high income strata were associated with a lower subjective discount rate. This
seeming contradiction may be because all of our respondents are poor, just that some are less
poor than others. Even our “high income” strata would be considered the lowest income strata in
Read & Read’s study population.
The third limitation is that although most theoretical models of time preference assume
that ability to enjoy consumption now and ability to enjoy consumption in the future (and their
difference) would be important determinants of subjective discount rate, our study did not have a
measure for “ability to enjoy future consumption.” We also lack a variable on expected health in
the future, which might have been a good proxy for the felicity function as expounded by Trostel
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& Taylor (2001) and as implicitly assumed in Becker & Mulligan (1997). Other studies also
suffer from this problem. To try and address this issue, we used data on the respondents´ current
and prior health, instead of future physical health, but these past health and past health change
variables were all insignificant determinants of subjective discount rates.
Despite the foregoing limitations, our study does have many strengths that improve on
others’ studies. First, our results are compelling because, despite a small sample size, our results
are robust to different specifications. We found that physical health, physical health squared,
survival probability, and survival probability squared were significant in most of the
specifications explained here as well as numerous others that we tried.
Second, we used comprehensive measures of health status that have been culturally
validated in Zulu speaking populations in South Africa (personal communication with Michelle
Koch of Qualitymetrics). The SF12 instrument combines multiple symptoms into one summary
scale each for physical health and for mental health, and is less subject to systematic
measurement error than single question health status measures (Dow et al. 1997). No other study
on time preference that we are aware of has incorporated the use of health status instruments;
most used only dichotomous categorization of good versus bad health or body mass index, which
may not be sensitive enough to capture the multiple dimensions of health and health differences
in the sample population. As suggested in the discussion, our use of a comprehensive measure of
health may be what contributed to our capturing the U-shaped relationship between health and
the subjective discount rate.
Third, our study is also the first to incorporate subjective probabilities of survival as a
determinant of time preference. Although most theories on why there is time preference make
use of mortality risk as one factor that reduces the utility of future consumption, most empirical
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studies on time preference resort to the use of age as the variable of interest. However, age
proxies for a lot of factors in life, with mortality risk as only one such factor. In particular, many
studies confound the differential effects of age and expected length of life on discounting.
Although age is correlated with health and expected survival probability, in sub-Saharan Africa
where morbidity and mortality risks are very high and where disease profiles are not necessarily
related to ageing, age may not be a good proxy for morbidity and mortality. For instance, HIV
morbidity and mortality afflict people age 20-40 far more than those below 20 or above 40
(Shisana et al. 2005).
Fourth, our study is the first to simultaneously control for age, health, survival, and future
consumption opportunities as co-determinants of the subjective discount rate. We separately
measure age, health, and expected length of life – all of which are very distinct. This teases apart
the contributions of each of these variables to time preference. For example, up to 15% of all
mortality in South Africa is non-health related and non-age related (e.g., homicide, suicide,
accidents; Statistics South Africa 2005). This should be reflected in longevity expectations, not
in health or in age. Further, our use of two-sided tobit regression also allows for less bias in the
estimation of these relationships, especially in the face of both left and right censoring of the
calculated subjective discount rate.
Fifth, our study incorporates a subjective economic outlook variable that may proxy for
consumption and income opportunities in the near future. Although all economic theories of time
preference subsume future consumption opportunity as a determinant of subjective discount rate,
no empirical study has included such a variable.
Finally, despite the set of 27 questions used to measure time preference, the consistency
of the answers is above 90%, which suggests that the respondents were not answering randomly.
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Moreover, based on the answers to the other questions in the survey about planning and savings
behavior, our time preference measure also shows strong construct validity in measuring
willingness to wait for the future.
In view of the strengths but also the limitations of our data, our results should be
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we find important and novel results regarding the
relationship between health and the subjective discount rate and longevity and the subjective
discount rate.
Our study has important policy implications. Our finding that subjective discount rates
differ by health levels implies that economic evaluation of healthcare programs that use results
from surveys of the public (who are likely to be healthier than those that are helped by the
potential health programs) may be inaccurately weighting future costs and benefits by not taking
into consideration that the subjective discount rate is a function of health status. Furthermore, the
provision of healthcare and health insurance (especially in countries with low health levels) may
improve health and survival, leading to more future-oriented thinking and investments for the
future; this positive externality should not be neglected in welfare analysis of these social
programs. Finally, there is the possibility that those who think they are extremely healthy or will
live forever discount the future more because of lack of information. This impedes their ability to
put the future into proper perspective, resulting in non-optimal inter-temporal trade-offs with
potential for regret later in life. Here, public health education to make the future more salient
may be an additional policy tool; alternatively, development and provision of pre-commitment
devices may also be welfare improving.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample

Mean
(S.D.)
Female (%)
Married or Cohabiting (%)
Education (% with no education)
Belief that the economy will worsen a lot (%)
Belief that income will decrease a lot (%)
Age

SF12 Scores
PCS12 (physical health score)

MCS12 (mental health score)

Subjective probability of survival
Probability of being alive in 1 year (%)

72.57
45.71
6.29
6.10
4.82
46.52
(15.09)

47.48
(12.06)
51.90
(10.86)

81.83
(19.71)

Probability of being alive in 5 years (%)

70.23
(26.04)

Probability of being alive in 10 years (%)

57.77
(31.11)

Overall Discount Rates

0.078
(0.084)

Number of observations

175
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Figure 1a: Frequency Diagram of Discount Rate
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Figure 1b: Frequency Diagram of ln(Discount Rate)
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Table 2a: Mean Discount Rate, by Sociodemographic Variables

Mean Discount Rate

Significance of Difference
Between Groups

0.071
0.081

Kruskal Wallace = 0.000; df = 1
p = 0.992

0.089
0.069

Krukal Wallace = 0.244; df = 1
p = 0.621

0.083
0.077

Kruskal Wallace = 0.614; df = 1
p = 0.433

0.083
0.067
0.087

Kruskal Wallace = 1.706; df = 2
p = 0.426

0.099
0.063
0.057
0.070
0.073

Spearman Rank Correlation
rho = -0.040
p = 0.603

0.080
0.065
0.071
0.072
0.079

Spearman Rank Correlation
rho = -0.042
p = 0.585

0.082
0.074
0.065
0.044
0.095

Spearman Rank Correlation
rho = 0.072
p = 0.344

0.077
0.051
0.080
0.067
0.088

Spearman Rank Correlation
rho = 0.028
p = 0.714

0.114
0.075
0.050
0.065
0.075

Spearman Rank Correlation
rho = 0.108
p = 0.156

0.066
0.106

one-tailed ttest
p = 0.009

0.067
0.110

one-tailed ttest
p = 0.010

Gender
Male
Female
Marital Status
Married or Cohabiting
Single, Divorced, Widowed
Business Ownership
Business Owner or Past Owner
Never Owner
Income
High Income
Middle Income
Low Income
Education
Lowest Quintile
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
Highest Quintile
Age
Lowest Quintile
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
Highest Quintile
Physical Health (pcs12)
Lowest Quintile
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
Highest Quintile
Mental Health (mcs12)
Lowest Quintile
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
Highest Quintile
1-Year Survival Probability
Lowest Quintile
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
Highest Quintile

Table 2b: Mean Discount Rate, by Selected Behavioral Variables

Planning Horizon
Plan Ahead All the Time
Live from Day to Day
Savings Behavior
Prefer Saving Money
Prefer Spending Money
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Figure 2a: Discount Rate vs. Age, Plot and Fitted Values
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Figure 2b: Discount Rate vs. PCS12, Plot and Fitted Values
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Figure 2c: Discount Rate vs. One-Year Survival Probability, Plot and Fitted Values
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Table 3: Double-Sided Tobit Regression: ln(dr_kirby*100) as the dependent variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Constant

3.855***
(1.291)

7.292***
(2.234)

2.619
(2.754)

6.988**
(3.415)

9.623***
(3.577)

7.469**
(3.664)

Age

-0.093*
(0.055)

-0.080
(0.056)

-0.082
(0.058)

-0.067
(0.057)

-0.039
(0.058)

-0.030
(0.057)

Age*Age

0.001
(0.000)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.000)

Female

0.414
(0.362)

0.434
(0.360)

0.416
(0.363)

0.422
(0.361)

0.448
(0.355)

0.242
(0.344)

Married or Cohabiting

0.087
(0.351)

0.040
(0.348)

0.076
(0.352)

0.025
(0.349)

-0.046
(0.343)

0.175
(0.333)

Area Dummy = Ntuzuma C

-0.911
(0.570)

-0.903
(0.563)

-0.866
(0.572)

-0.856
(0.566)

-0.792
(0.573)

-0.854
(0.562)

Area Dummy = Klaarwater

-0.456
(0.513)

-0.457
(0.508)

-0.446
(0.516)

-0.462
(0.511)

-0.628
(0.504)

-0.314
(0.486)

Area Dummy = Umlazi J

-0.881
(0.543)

-0.744
(0.538)

-0.825
(0.547)

-0.676
(0.542)

-0.761
(0.474)

-1.056**
(0.532)

Area Dummy = Kwa Mgaga

-0.897
(0.560)

-0.962*
(0.555)

-0.855
(0.562)

-0.911*
(0.557)

-0.926*
(0.550)

-0.667
(0.530)

Area Dummy = Clare Estates

-1.313**
(0.553)

-1.341**
(0.545)

-1.281**
(0.555)

-1.297**
(0.548)

-1.444***
(0.540)

-1.322**
(0.508)

No education

2.330***
(0.725)

2.171***
(0.730)

2.391***
(0.749)

2.163***
(0.754)

2.322***
(0.752)

3.003***
(0.770)

PCS12

-0.233**
(0.096)

-0.240**
(0.097)

-0.165*
(0.099)

-0.131
(0.097)

PCS12 squared

0.003***
(0.001)

0.003***
(0.001)

0.002**
(0.001)

0.002*
(0.001)

MCS12

0.024
(0.110)

-0.015
(0.109)

0.001
(0.000)

-0.045
(0.112)

MCS12 squared

-0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

Longevity

-0.156***
(0.059)

-0.118**
(0.059)

Longevity squared

0.001***
(0.000)

0.001**
(0.000)

Economic Outlook for Next 2 Years
Improve a lot

1.144
(0.875)

Improve a little

1.727***
(0.679)

Remain the same

1.417**
(0.666)

Worsen a little

1.642**
(0.689)

Observations
Mean of the Dependent Variable
Pr > Chi-square
Pseudo R-square

0.025
0.029

0.001
0.039

175
1.117
0.050
0.031

Note: Values in parentheses represent standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

0.017
0.040

0.001
0.051

164
1.134
0.000
0.069

